Conscience absolutism via legislative amendment by West-Oram, Peter G N & Nunes, Jordanna A A
Conscience absolutism via legislative amendment
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
West-Oram, Peter G N and Nunes, Jordanna A A (2021) Conscience absolutism via legislative 
amendment. Clinical Ethics. pp. 1-5. ISSN 1477-7509 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/103105/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 




Conscience Absolutism via Legislative Amendment.  
N.B. This paper was accepted for publication in the journal Clinical Ethics 
on the 7t h November 2021. This document is the Accepted version of the 
paper, before journal formatting, please do not cite this version. The final,  
published version is  available here:  
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14777509211063593.  
(DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/14777509211063593).  
Peter West-Oram and Jordanna A. A. Nunes  
Abstract  
On the 30th June 2021, Ohio state Governor,  Mike DeWine, signed a Bil l which 
would enact the state’s budget for the next two years. In addition to its core 
funding imperatives, the Bil l also contained an amendment significantly 
expanding entitlements of health care providers to conscientiously object  to 
professional duties to provide controversial health care services. This 
amendment has been heavily cri ticised as providing the means to allow health 
care providers to discriminate against a wide range of persons by denying them 
access to often contested services such as abortion and contraception. 
In this paper we examine the implications of this amendment and situate it  in 
relation to other legislative actions intended to guarantee absolute rights to 
conscientious objection. In doing so,  we argue that the entitlements extended 
to health care providers by these Bills  are overly broad and ignore their  
potential to allow significant harm to be caused to cl ients. We then argue that  
if  health care providers should have rights to conscientiously object (a question 
we do not try an answer here),  then any legislation intended to protect  such 
rights should be limited, specific, and parsimonious. Where it  is not,  the 












On the 30th June 2021, Ohio state Governor,  Mike DeWine, signed the Bill  
which would enact  the state’s budget for the next two years.(1) In addition to  
its core funding imperatives,  the Bill also contained an amendment  
significantly expanding entitlements of health care providers (HCPs) to 
conscientiously object to professional duties to provide controversial  health 
care services.(1) This amendment has been heavily criticised by LGBT 
organisations, which have argued that it  provides significant scope for health 
care providers to refuse service to members of the LGBT community.(2) 
Simultaneously,  the amendment would also allow significant freedom to HCPs 
to refuse to provide often contested services such as abortion and 
contraception.  
The Ohio Amendment has not emerged from a vacuum. Indeed, far from being 
a radical  departure from the discourse surrounding conscientious objection, it  
is merely the latest in a series of legislat ive and li tigative manoeuvres which 
erode entitlements to basic health care services by pushing for an absolutist 
understanding of HCP’s individual freedom and rights to conscientious 
objection.(3) Our goal in this paper is  to highlight the implications of the Ohio 
Amendment’s extensions of the right to conscientious objection, and argue that  





To achieve this goal , we first situate the Ohio Amendment in its context of 
other Bills  and legal  proceedings aimed at  extending the right to conscientious 
objection. Second, we examine the arguments given for granting “conscience 
based exemptions” (CBEs)(4) to health care providers. Third,  we note that the 
exemptions granted in the USA specifically may reasonably be seen as 
analogous to a deliberate strategy identified by the Guttmacher Institute,  to 
limit access to contraception and abortion.(5) Fourth, we show how the CBEs 
granted by the Ohio Amendment depart  from, and undermine, what Daniel  
Brock has called the “conventional compromise” in conscientious objection.(6) 
Finally,  we argue that in so doing, that the concessions granted by these Bills  
exceed what can be reasonably justified by the (potentially legitimate) concern 
for the personal l iberty of health care providers.  
The Ohio Amendment in Context  
Conscience protection laws are not a recent phenomenon in the jurisdictions 
with which we are concerned in this paper, having emerged alongside, and in 
response to laws permitting abortion in the United States(7) and United 
Kingdom (indeed in the UK, the condit ions for CBEs to the provision of 
abortion is written into the 1967 Abortion Act).(8) However, in recent years,  
the long running debate surrounding conscientious objection in health care has 
become increasingly heated.(9–11) This is  partly because of the increasing 
number of cases in which requests for CBEs are made, and part ly because of  
the way in which appeals to freedom of conscience are used in increasingly 
expansive ways that limit the rights of cl ients to basic health care services. 1  
Equally,  the enactment of the Obama Administration’s Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) prompted a number of legal challenges to certain 
provisions of the Act on grounds that they obliged employers and insurers to 
                                                 
1 Fol lowing West -Oram and Buyx,  we  use the term “cl ient”  to  re fer  to  those  access ing hea lth  
care services in consc ientious object ion scenar ios ,  s ince conscience c la ims can also  be made  




provide insurance coverage for services which some people may believe are 
immoral.(9–12)  
The scope of these various legislative and litigative expansions of the right to 
conscientiously object in the health care context varies. The British Abortion 
Act for example offers relatively limited concessions to objectors, while more 
recent legislat ion in Mississippi provides extremely broad scope to the range 
of health care services from which objecting providers may excuse 
themselves.(13) Indeed, the both the Mississippi Act and Ohio Amendment  
expand the range of agents that may excuse themselves from participating in 
the provision of such services in this way, to include non-clinical  health care 
staff, as well as health insurance providers and employers.(1,13) This 
expansion of conscience rights to insurers and employers was also expanded at  
the American Federal  level by the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
(SCOTUS) ruling in Burwell vs.  Hobby Lobby et al .  which found in favour of 
a group of religious employers who wished to opt out of paying for insurance 
coverage for certain contraceptives which were mandated by the 
PPACA.(10,14) Further extensions and expansions at the State and Federal 
level were made by later lawsuits,(11,12,15) while Texas and Arkansas each 
enacted legislat ion further entrenching HCP rights to conscientious 
objection.(15,16) Importantly,  this expansion of the right to conscientious  
objection is  not a uniquely American phenomenon – in the United Kingdom, a 
Bill aimed at a similar expansion of the rights of health care workers to 
conscientiously object to participating in the provision of contested services is  
currently under review in the House of Lords.(17) 
Collectively,  these legislat ive efforts serve to empower health care providers 
in their various legislations and extend their rights to opt out of otherwise 
applicable professional duties. In some cases, such as the bill  proposed in the 
UK, this would “merely” extend the reach of existing professional entitlements 
(al lowing physicians to opt out of more things),  while in others, such as the 
Mississippi Bil l,  and Ohio Amendment, new categories of agent are granted 




required of providers for a CBE to be granted. While enacted in different 
jurisdictions, these individual pieces of legislat ion and litigation can be seen 
as part  of an increasing trend to priorit ise a specific type of individual liberty 
of HCPs (to complete ideological freedom) regardless of the consequences for 
other persons. As we argue in the following section, the pursuit of this goal  
ignores connection between HCP exercise of freedom, and denial of freedom 
of others.  
Ideological Freedom in Relation to Other Rights 
The right to conscientiously object is argued to be a necessary derivative of 
the right to freedom of conscience which ‘defines the limits of political  
obligation’.(18) Guaranteeing a right to conscientious objection is  therefore 
argued to be necessary in order to avoid discriminating against those with 
minority moral perspectives, and enable them to participate fully in society 
without having to perform actions which they believe to be immoral, such as 
providing abortions,  or joining the military.(10) To require such compliance is 
argued to be harmful to objectors because it  does not respect their autonomy,  
and restricts their individual freedom to make private choices.(19) 
These defences of rights to conscientious objection are framed in terms of the 
harm that would be inflicted on objectors by requiring them to perform actions 
they hold to be immoral. The focus is  therefore entirely on the identity and 
beliefs of the objecting provider. They and the consequences of their actions 
are therefore taken to be independent and causally isolated from other agents. 
The consequences for the client, and indeed their demographic identity,  is thus 
claimed to be irrelevant to the objecting provider and those advocating for the 
extension of their professional freedoms. It is therefore argued not to be a 
matter of denying access to or discriminating against clients ,  but merely of 
avoiding harm to the provider by requiring them to participate in the provision 
of a service  to which they assert a moral  objection.  




However,  even if this “service not person” claim is sincere, it  does not provide 
adequate justification for the broad rights to conscientious objection 
guaranteed by the legislat ion noted above. Further,  the exclusive focus of 
conscience advocates on the wellbeing of providers leads to significantly 
harmful consequences for the clients of objecting HCPs. For example,  as noted 
by the Human Rights Campaign, the provisions of the Arkansas Act are so 
broad they would allow harmful denials of care to members of the LGBTQ 
community,  on the grounds that the care in question was contrary to the beliefs 
of an HCP.(20) Such provisions also make it harder to prove that a denial of 
service was the result of unlawful discrimination against  a member of a 
protected group, or because of the legal  exercise of a right to conscientious 
objection. To illustrate with the conventional case, it  is  possible for a physician 
to refuse to provide an abortion to their patient under the legislat ion noted 
above; physician A may refuse to provide an abortion to anyone, because they 
believe that abortion is immoral. In contrast,  physician B may refuse abortion 
to patients,  not  because they oppose abortion per se ,  but because they believe 
that women are not entitled to the same bodily integrity or reproductive 
autonomy rights as men (though as we argue below, these posit ions are closely 
entwined). Where physician A merely objects to providing a service they 
believe is immoral, physician B is motivated by discriminatory animus against 
women. Unless physician B reveals their motivation, it  would be impossible 
for any of their clients to prove that they had been discriminated against , and 
that their physician had acted in a manner not covered by their right to 
conscientious objection. Thus,  the laws provide tremendous scope for covert  
discrimination under the guise of legal  conscientious objections.  
There is also good reason to question the sincerity and validity of the “service 
not person” claim noted above.(5) While some  weight must be given to the 
claims that  discrimination and/or denials of service are not the goal of the 
noted laws, their consequences alone give reason to be sceptical  about the 
validity of this argument.  To illustrate, in the United States,  there is a 
deliberate and concerted effort to limit  access to abortion and contraception 




Such laws are typically framed by their advocates as ways to protect  women 
and deliver higher quality care.  However, they have been widely criticised as 
frequently imposing unnecessary restrictions which limit  access to care 
without improving it,  and in some cases actively making i t worse.(21) 
Analogously,  as discussed above, conscience laws offer significant protection 
to HCPs, but offer l it tle or no consideration of the impact on their clients, with 
similarly predictable consequences.(7,10,22) There is  thus a similar disconnect  
between the justifications offered for TRAP laws and extensions of the right 
to conscientious objection, and their anticipated and realised outcomes. Where 
TRAP laws are defended on grounds of protecting women, conscience 
exemptions are promoted as a means to protect the moral integrity of HCPs. 
Both have entirely predictable, harmful consequences for similar 
demographics, whose access to care is subject to the ideological commitments 
of legislators and HCPs precisely because in both cases those consequences are 
not considered. Thus,  even if  the aim of TRAP laws and CBEs is not 
discriminatory,  they often cause significant discriminatory harm.  
Avoiding Discrimination Through Compromise? 
Given the potential  for harm to be caused to clients by the denials of service 
of objecting HCPs, legislat ion granting rights to conscientious objection often 
includes requirements intended to ensure that clients retain access to contested 
services. For example, CBEs are typically not permitted in emergency 
situations, and objecting providers are often required to refer clients to 
alternative sources of provision.(8) Collectively,  these provisions have been 
loosely categorised as the “conventional compromise”, intended to ensure an 
approximation of a satisfactory outcome for all parties.(6) Providers are not 
(usually) obliged to participate in the provision of care to which they assert a 
moral  objection, thus maintaining significant professional and personal 
freedom and avoiding the harm of participation in actions they believe to be 
immoral, while cl ients retain access to contested services. This compromise 
remains controversial however,  with some conscience advocates arguing that  




contested service being provided, meaning that they still  retain (marginally 
more distant) causal responsibility for its delivery.  (23,24)   
The Ohio Amendment leans away from the conventional compromise, and while 
it  does contain language which suggests that  referral to an alternative source 
of medical provision may be appropriate,  it  is entirely at the discretion of the 
medical practitioner.(1) Indeed, the “duty” to refer is also subject to the right 
to conscientiously object  under the Ohio Amendment, and there is no 
obligation to ensure that another HCP is willing or available to provide the 
contested service.(1) Thus, there is no conventional compromise in Ohio. As 
noted, there are reasons to question the legitimacy of the conventional  
compromise,  given that  it  does not remove objectors from the causal  chain 
leading to the provision of contested services,  and thus may be suggested to 
not actually reflect  a genuine compromise.(25) However,  in its  absence,  access 
to contested services becomes tenuous at best, since providers can 
conscientiously object in most contexts, and have no responsibility to ensure 
that clients they reject are able to find care elsewhere. Ohio therefore presents 
(another) case study demonstrating the consequences of unrestricted and 
uncompromising rights to conscientious objection. If  HCPs may refuse any 
health service without an obligation to refer, their clients will almost certainly 
face significantly reduced access to care.  The breadth of the provisions in the 
Ohio Amendment are so extensive that they present an alarming foreshadowing 
of the potential  for “anarchy” in the health care system,(22) whereby virtually 
anyone can assert an objection to virtually any care. The uncertainty of access 
to care created by such an outcome is innately harmful to clients, because it  
means that  in contexts of significant vulnerability and medical need they will  
not know whether they will  be able to receive potentially urgent care,  or 
whether their claims will be rejected.  
In addition, while the Ohio Amendment does require that providers declare any 
objections publicly in advance, the breadth of the freedoms to conscientiously 
object , and the indemnity from discrimination for so doing that the amendment 




where that care is  subject  to controversy,  will  be extremely challenging for 
administrators of health care systems. Thus,  the compensatory burdens 
generated by the extremely broad rights to conscientious objection contained 
within the various pieces of legislation noted above, falls on the colleagues of 
objectors,  as well  as their clients.(22) Importantly,  this burden is imposed, and 
is harmful and unjust, regardless of whether this institutional  and structural 
anarchy is  caused by discriminatory animus, or the exercise of rights to 
freedom of conscience.  
Conscience Absolutism Vs. Compromised Conscience 
The freedom to live according to one’s personal moral  code and avoid being 
forced to perform actions one holds to be immoral is  integral to our entitlement 
to be acknowledged as autonomous moral agents.  Nevertheless, this freedom 
is, and must be, constrained by the effect  of its exercise on other people.(10)  
Conscience is  important,  but undue deference to it ,  and legislat ing with 
excessive breadth and insufficient regard for the distribution of the 
compensatory burdens required to facilitate CBEs allows for the imposition of 
harmful consequences upon people who are already the target of discrimination 
and persecution. The Ohio amendment further undermines our legislat ive 
understanding of the appropriate responsibilities of HCPs by interpreting CBEs 
as purely a matter for the private interests of HCPs, independently of their  
impact on clients, colleagues, and society more broadly.  While it  is argued that  
the intention is not discriminatory,  and that the focus of CBEs in the Bill,  and 
its analogues, is on avoiding contested services, rather than disrespected 
persons, the effect  is the same – the state license of almost absolute,  
unconstrained freedom to HCPs at the cost  of the welfare of already 
marginalised people,  to say nothing of the administrat ive and professional 
burdens imposed on non-objecting HCPs who will incur addit ional duties to  
compensate for the objections of their colleagues. If it  is  legit imate to permit  
CBEs in the health care context, and we make no claim to either answer here,  




be limited, specific,  and parsimonious.  Where it  is  not,  the ideological liberty 
of HCPs treads dangerously on the physical freedom of their clients.  
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